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The Cushman Report

Preface

A Crisis of Choice, Not Chance

Robert Cushman

In early 2025, the State of Rhode Island took the unusual step of stripping the Warwick School Committee of its fiscal authority, placing city schools under the control of a state-appointed budget commission. This intervention came as a shock in Warwick, a sudden fiscal crisis brought on by multi-million-dollar deficits in the salary budget.

For me, however, this moment was not a surprise. It was the inevitability of twenty years of ignored warnings.

Two decades ago, as Chairman of the School Committee, I warned that Warwick was entering a dangerous demographic era. I predicted that unless we structurally realigned school staffing and facilities to match our declining student population, we would face a fiscal collapse. I argued then, as I show now, that a school system cannot shrink its enrollment by nearly one-third while maintaining the staffing and footprint of a fully populated district.

This report is the documentation of that failure. It is an autopsy of the “Warwick Way”—a twenty-year refusal to adapt to reality.

Through the analysis of data from many sources, some spanning more than two decades, this report identifies three distinct phases of governance in the Warwick School Department: the Strategic Alignment of the early years, the Reactive Alignment of the middle years, and the catastrophic Structural Decoupling of the last five years.

The data proves that Warwick schools were not underfunded by the city. In fact, city and state funding increased, particularly from 2020 to 2025. The crisis was caused by a refusal to right-size. Between 2021 and 2025 alone, if the School Committee had simply maintained staffing levels consistent with enrollment, the district would have saved $29.2 million—more than enough to avoid the current deficit and the subsequent state takeover.

But this is not just a story of numbers; it is a story of a lack of leadership. This report exposes how, with the school department facing its greatest financial peril, the leaders of the School Committee were forced to recuse themselves from teacher contract negotiations. It details how negotiations were outsourced to lawyers and mediators who prioritized labor peace over fiscal survival. It reveals the tragic contradiction of leaders who lobbied loudly against state fiscal mandates but silently accepted ethical mandates that disenfranchised the taxpayers they were sworn to represent.

Equally damning is the failure of the Warwick School Building Committee. Charged with overseeing tens of millions of dollars in bond-funded renovations, this body had a fiduciary duty to ensure that Warwick was not pouring concrete into empty buildings. Yet the record shows that from 2019 to 2025, the committee spent more than $16 million renovating elementary school buildings operating at barely 50% to 60% capacity—without once placing consolidation on the agenda.

Instead of shrinking our footprint to match enrollment, Warwick renovated the empty seats, committing taxpayers to maintaining a sprawling, underutilized infrastructure that we simply do not need. We reconstructed the shell of a district that no longer exists.

Furthermore, this same building committee is responsible for managing the $350 million construction of two new high schools. We are mortgaging the city's future to construct massive new facilities for a student population that can barely fill the existing ones. Proceeding with a dual-high-school model in a district where middle and high school utilization hovers near 50% ignores the demographic reality that a single, unified high school might have been the far more fiscally responsible choice.

Compounding this structural failure is a parallel reckoning on the municipal side. For those who believe the city can simply write a check to solve this problem, I offer a stark warning: the city is facing its own solvency crisis. With the $350 million high school bonds entering their steep repayment phase and unfunded pension and healthcare liabilities growing, the City of Warwick has effectively maxed out its credit card with more than a billion dollars in debt.

We are witnessing the collision of two debt bombs: a school system that cannot pay its operating costs and a city government that has mortgaged its future to pay for buildings and unsustainable retiree packages. The era of kicking the can down the road has ended.

Finally, we must recognize that this report is not merely an exercise in accounting; it is a wake-up call for those who will be forced to foot the bill—the Warwick taxpayer. The true cost of this twenty-year failure will not be paid by the politicians who delayed difficult decisions, but by the grandmother struggling to keep her home on a fixed income, the young family living paycheck to paycheck, and the small business owner already operating on razor-thin margins.

Every dollar wasted on an empty classroom, bloated staffing, or an unneeded renovation is a dollar extracted from the pockets of those who can least afford it. By refusing to make the difficult decisions required to right-size our government, Warwick has effectively levied a mismanagement tax on its most vulnerable residents—a burden that threatens to make the city unaffordable for the very people who built this community.

I present this report not to assign blame for the sake of history, but to provide Mayor Frank Picozzi, the Warwick City Council, Warwick Superintendent Bill McCaffrey, the Warwick School Committee, the Warwick Public School Budget Commission, and most importantly, Warwick taxpayers with the evidence trail. We cannot fix a problem we refuse to acknowledge. Warwick's fiscal crisis was not an act of God. It was a crisis of choice.

It is my hope that by understanding the structural decoupling of the last five years, Warwick can finally begin the painful but necessary work of realignment in the school department and pursue a more serious focus on reforming the city's cost structure.

Sincerely,

Robert Cushman